Ownership, Participation and Work Restructuring in the Kibbutz:

A Comparative Perspective

A growing interest in the kibbutz experience with organizational and workplace democracy, worker ownership, quality of working life, etc. has been expressed by scholars in recent years (Russel, 1985; Greenberg, 1986; Blasi, 1988; Rothschild-Whitt, and Russel, R.; Rus, 1984; Cherns, 1980; Rayman, ). In addition to scientific inquiry into the non-conventional structures and institutions of kibbutz work organizations and communities, these studies have also been motivated also by the search for lessons that could be transferred to other countries and circumstances. Because of these motivations, most of the studies have focused on aspects of the kibbutz experience that can more easily be compared with other experiences; Thus, more attention has been paid to work organizations, especially worker participation in decision making in industrial plants and to the unique ownership patterns and changes in the attitude toward work. It would do well, therefore, to examine the the types of ownership, the forms of workplace democracy and the practice of work restructuring in the kibbutz and to relate any patterns found to communal social structure and ideology.

It is our thesis that it is not the ownership form per se that determines the degree and forms of worker participation and work restructuring. All these institutional forms are rooted in the values and social structure of the kibbutz, and especially in the dissociation between a member's work contribution and the distribution of material rewards.

From a comparative perspective, the kibbutz experience might be relevant to the general question of the compatibility of worker ownership with workplace democracy and work restructuring if a strong relationship can be shown between these areas. The
kibbutz case will be demonstrated to lie at one pole of a continuum of types of worker ownership on which other experiences, such as Yugoslavian self-management, Mondragon, traditional and grass roots cooperatives, as well as U.S. Esop's on the other pole can be also placed.

**What is kibbutz ownership?**

It is rather astonishing that in the vast research literature on the kibbutz, the question of the type of kibbutz ownership is rarely mentioned. The formal answer to this question is that it is a type of cooperative ownership, since the legal form chosen by kibbutz communities is that of a "cooperative society," as defined in the Cooperative Society Ordinance issued in 1933 by the British Mandate government and still in function. The ordinance embraces a variety of cooperative societies, including not only the conventional types of cooperative organizations, (e.g. producer, service, consumer cooperatives), but also pension funds, mutual insurance, etc. The specific character of each society is defined by its by-laws, which have to be registered with the registrar of cooperative societies.

The assumption of a cooperative character by the kibbutz community, and therefore of its particular type of ownership, also stems from a comparative perspective. Bergman (1980) for example, placed the kibbutz in a continuum of cooperative forms as "an institution with the highest degree of integration and the widest latitudes of functions" (p. 49). Comparing different types of rural production cooperatives, he stressed both the commonalities and the differences between the less-integrated Kolchoz and Chinese communes and the fully integrated kibbutz. Blasi, Mehrling and Whyte (1984) compared the kibbutz with Yugoslav self-management and the Mondragon cooperatives and referred to the kibbutz as "comprehensive cooperatives" (p. 300); however, they also briefly described the special features of kibbutz ownership that deviate from conventional cooperative ownership.
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Disagreements have also been expressed on the definition of kibbutz communities as integrated or comprehensive cooperatives. In the early 50s, Y. Shatil (1960, p. 199), a well-known kibbutz economist, delineated the basic differences between the kibbutz and other types of rural producer-cooperatives. All the other types are based on a combination of cooperative and private ownership. In many cases - as in the Kolhoz - there is also private ownership of parts of the means of production. In all other types of cooperatives there are besides the cooperative economic organization, a private household and private ownership of the means of consumption, such as housing, cars, durable consumption items, etc.
On different occasions, legal specialists as well as kibbutz members themselves have expressed doubts about the suitability of the legal definition of the kibbutz as a cooperative society. Una, (1985), a kibbutz member and former member of the Israeli Parliament, emphasized that the Cooperative Societies Ordinance was suitable for organizations with primary economic purposes, and therefore not for the kibbutz (p. 212). The main goals of the kibbutz are not economic, and its activities are directed not only for the benefit of its members. Broad ideological goals stand at the center of kibbutz self-definition: as the first paragraph of the kibbutz by-laws state: “It is a pioneer in the national renewal, aiming to create in Israel a socialist society based on economic and social equality.” Similar arguments led in the early 1970s to an attempt to formulate a special legal framework for the kibbutz that would fit its unique ideological principles and social and economic structure and institutions. Changes in political circumstances caused this project to be postponed, however, and the contradiction between its legal definition as a “cooperative society” and the sociological essence of the kibbutz continues. This contradiction remains bearable only because the Cooperative Societies Ordinance, as one critic described it, has been “designed like the
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According to its by-laws, the kibbutz rejects any type of private property. When joining the kibbutz, the new member is obliged - subject to certain qualifications - to transfer his property to the kibbutz. There are no shares in the kibbutz, and the member has no claims on kibbutz assets. The kibbutz does not distribute profits, and all the surplus is added to the its assets. (These statements are based on paragraphs 42-45 of the by-law). These provisions are in clear contradiction to the rules of all other Israeli cooperative organizations and almost all of the traditional cooperatives in capitalist countries.

Although the above examples have shown the weakness of attempts to define kibbutz communities as cooperatives, there seems to be a stronger rationale in defining them comparatively as "communal societies", for which no generally agreed definition actually exists. They vary from religious communities, such as the Hutterian Brothers to hippie-type communes, and were much more numerous and varied in the United States during the 19th century.

In contradistinction to the cooperative organization, the central goal of communal societies is not economic but religious, socialist-utopian or life style. In addition to ideological motivation, a main common denominator of communal societies is a communal household (Meron, 1987). In the religious communities, the "community of goods," the common ownership of all the means of life and not only of the means of production, had also a profound religious meaning (Oved, 1988). Kanter (1972) considered the transfer of personal belongings to the community to be an important mechanism of commitment to the communal society. On the other hand, some of the non-religious communities required new members to buy shares as a way for the community to mobilize needed financial resources. These communities were usually not successful and short-lived. Infield (1947) described them as a mixture between "a cooperative organization in the field of finances and communal organizations in the area of work and consumption" (p. 18).
In the light of this brief discussion, a definition of kibbutz ownership as cooperative ownership is not suitable; rather it is suggested that "communal ownership" is more appropriate. Communal ownership is comprehensive, including both the means of production and the means needed for consumption or other types of activities. Ownership is indivisible among the members, and the ownership is by the community and not by a specific group of members. A member's share in the ownership depends on his or her membership in the community, not on working in one of the communal economic enterprises.

In a way, the concept of communal ownership can be seen in Marxian terms as the positive transcendence of private property, when, at least inside the community, direct, transparent human relations replace commodity fetishism (Russel, 1985). Communal ownership can therefore be seen as leading to de-alienation through the implementation of the basic principle of the kibbutz: "from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs."

Contrary to Marx's assumption, however, this principle is implemented in the case of Israeli kibbutzim, not by the overall society, but by a small sector of a basically capitalist society. The existential problem of the kibbutz is how to maintain this "non-alienated community" to continue the implementation of the above-mentioned principle, thereby avoiding the fate of most communal societies in the past all over the world: the eventual loss of their communal identity. One of the solutions to this problem that emerged was the development of kibbutz ownership not only as "communal ownership" but also as "social ownership."

The term "social ownership of property" became familiar as part of the overall Yugoslavian system of self-management. It was developed as a reaction against the Soviet conception that state property is the highest form of property and, as such, provides the foundations for socialist production relations.
In contrast to state ownership, the social ownership concept stresses the autonomy of the self-managed economic organization so that the workers can use the means of production and enjoy the fruits of their labor. Karelj (1975) stated that “social property is both the common class property of all the workers and a form of individual property of those who work” (p. 40). The purpose of the “class property” is to avoid having social property become “group property.” Workers should enjoy only the fruits of their work, but not ownership per se (Horvat, 1982, p. 236). Thus, large income differences among factories or income resulting from capital gains and not from labor are considered deviations from the social ownership principles (ibid., p. 238). Golubovic mentions two types of deviations: “the state disposing of property” at the macro-level and the form of “group appropriation” at the micro level.” She assumed that one of the reasons for these deviations is “the fact that there is no legally defined subject of property, either as an individual or group, or as an institution, but rather it is society that is the bearer of property rights” (Golubovic, 1986).

The Yugoslav concept of social ownership was developed in the 1950s in the framework of Yugoslavia’s split from the Soviet bloc and the effort to develop an alternative ideologic system. The kibbutz concept of social ownership developed during the long process of building the Israeli labor economy in the framework of a capitalist society.

On 2 August, 1921 David Ben-Gurion presented to the leadership of his party a first draft for the overall organization of the different parts of the labor economy in a “Worker’s Society.” A central aim of this proposal was to counter the development of group ownership by urban producer cooperatives and by the first kibbutzim, which might transform them eventually into regular capitalist enterprises. “The economy of the kibbutzim,” he argued, “does not contribute to the well-being of the working class,...It is private ownership by the kibbutz members” (Ben-Gurion, 1921). Ben-Gurion’s proposed the transfer of ownership rights from the kibbutz and from the different types of cooperatives (urban producer cooperatives and rural moshav
communities) to the Histadrut (the General Federation of Labour). The members of kibbutzim and cooperatives would not deal at all with marketing and, therefore, not obtain profits resulting from the supply-and-demand market mechanism.

Ben-Gurion's proposals dealing with the kibbutz and the cooperatives comprised only one component of a very comprehensive project. That aimed at creating a centralistic economic organization. It dealt not only with the formal ownership of the different economic units, but also with their organization of work in order to assure an egalitarian distribution of income. The major part of the working class was supposed to work in this centralized labor economy.

Ben-Gurion's proposals met with opposition both inside and outside his party. While some opponents criticized the centralist, 'statist' concept and favored decentralization and autonomy, others had doubts about the possibility of the realization of the project. Gradually Ben Gurion introduced changes in his proposal; and when the second congress of the Histadrut decided in 1924 to create the 'Society of Workers,' the latter became a comprehensive legal framework for economic activities that were up to then conducted separately by different bodies (Greenberg, 1987). A special institution was set up as the legal framework for the kibbutz and moshav communities: the aim of the 'Society of Worker Settlements' was both to represent these communities before organizations that supplied land and capital for new settlements and to represent the general interests of the working class before such communities.

At a later stage, a legal entity Nir was created as bearer of ownership rights. These rights are very clearly spelled out in the by-laws that form the legal framework of the kibbutz: Paragraph 44 states that the property of a kibbutz cannot be divided among the members, neither during the existence of the kibbutz nor after its liquidation. Paragraph 125 states that in case of liquidation, the property of the kibbutz will be transferred to Nir, which will use the assets, in coordination with the kibbutz federation to which the kibbutz belongs, to create, develop and consolidate other kibbutzim of this federation.
This last paragraph introduced an important new element in the concept of kibbutz social ownership. Whereas the initial idea of Nir and its antecedents in the different versions of Ben Gurion’s project was to represent the ownership rights of the working class, paragraph 125 deals with the transfer of assets to other kibbutzim within the same ideological affiliation. The secondary role allotted to Nir and the centrality of the kibbutz federations result from the fact that Nir is only a legal entity, having no permanent role and activity; the federations on the other hand, fulfill a vital, and central role in the life of the kibbutz communities.

A parallel can be drawn between the “theoretical” role of Nir and the abstract concept of society as a bearer of property rights in Yugoslavia as cited above. On the other hand, the kibbutz federations are, in Gulobic’s terms, very concrete “bearers of property”.

The vital role of the federations in the establishment of new kibbutzim, in their guidance in the different areas of kibbutz life, (economic, social, educational, cultural, etc.) and as representants of their ideological and political identities, has in a way ironically contributed to perpetuating the role of Nir. For many years this entity has not functioned at all in the moshav communities, where most of the property - except for the state owned land and the limited cooperative enterprises - is private. In contrast, the kibbutz federations have opted for ideological reasons - as expressions of the solidarity with the working class and membership in the Histadrut - to maintain the role of Nir in spite of the ambiguities that this creates.

These ambiguities were given voice in a question asked by one of the participants at a symposium on the legal status of the kibbutz (Tzur, 1972). Citing the first paragraph of the kibbutz by laws, “The kibbutz is a free association - organized on the basis of collective ownership of the assets,” J. Tzur asked: “Who is the collectivity that owns the assets of the kibbutz?” Was it Nir or the Society of Workers? Surely the intention was not ownership by the kibbutz, he said, since in that case the paragraph
would have had to be formulated as follows: ...the ownership of the assets by the kibbutz (ibid. p. 38).

It seems to me that the right answer to this question is this: the bundle of ownership rights is divided among different collectivities. The kibbutz collectivity has all the "usufruct" rights over the kibbutz assets. The kibbutz is almost autonomous in decision making concerning the use of these assets for production and consumption purposes, and kibbutz members can decide how to divide the net income between consumption and investment. These ownership rights belong to the category of "collective owning of equity by belonging" in Russel's (1985) categorization of workplace ownership types (p. 23), although in the kibbutz case, it is not only workplace ownership, but overall communal ownership.

A new member enjoys these rights without having to buy shares or pay membership fees and upon leaving the kibbutz loses them without either for these rights or for his/her share in the assets that have been accumulated during this interval. The basis for the severance payment to which members leaving the kibbutz are entitled are the average consumption expenses for a kibbutz member multiplied by the number of years of membership. These payments are the same for all members of all kibbutzim and not related to the assets or current economic situation of any particular kibbutz.

Only the usufruct rights are owned, by virtue of belonging to the kibbutz collectivity. The right to "abuse," to sell or to transfer the assets belongs, as seen above, to two other collectivities - the kibbutz federation and Nir the legal entity, representing the Israeli working class organized in the Histadrut. As previously mentioned the effective user of these rights is the federation, and the question whether the federation does not also limit the usufruct rights merits further consideration.

In actual practice, there are several such limitations, but they are voluntarily accepted by the kibbutz communities and have no legal basis.
Since the 1940s, the kibbutz federations each year present to their respective kibbutz communities a normative consumption budget, suggesting how much to spend on the different consumption areas, for which the kibbutz is responsible: food, electricity, education, etc. Deviations from this budget vary at most between 10 and 20 percent in a given area, but generally there is conformity to the budget inspite of rather big differences in the economic situation of the various kibbutz communities. Therefore, almost no correlations have been found between the yearly income of a kibbutz and its yearly consumption expenses (Helman, 1980). The differences in living conditions between kibbutzim are therefore limited, and manifested more in housing conditions, certain luxuries (e.g., travel abroad) and the type of public buildings than in current consumption. Another limitation of kibbutz economic autonomy is the mutual aid among kibbutzim and their mutual responsibility in the framework of the federation. Kibbutz communities contribute to the central financial fund of their federation which functions almost like a bank in mobilizing capital for investments in the kibbutzim, with the special assistance of the Bank of the Histadrut. The kibbutz communities invest a considerable amount of manpower (up to 5 percent of the membership) in the activities of the federations, which have mutual aid as a major aim besides the advancement of ideological and political goals.

The ideological foundation of this concept of social ownership was quite clearly expressed by one kibbutz leader, when dealing with the relationship between the kibbutz community and the kibbutz movement. “Our socialist conception is” he said: “No bureaucratic nationalized economy, alienated from its workers, no self-managed cooperative or collective economy without control by the collectivity. Self-managed economy and social ownership that builds a bridge between two poles: autonomy and economic collectivism” (Rosen, 1988, p. 140).

In our analysis of kibbutz social ownership, mention has been made of some of the similarities with and differences from the Yugoslav system of social ownership and self management. This comparison may now be done in a more systematic way.
Features shared in common by the two types of social ownership are follows:

1) The division between usufruct rights exercised by the kibbutz or the self managed unit and formal property rights, which belong to society in Yugoslavia and to Nir and the federation in Israel.

2) Ownership by belonging, with no entry payment and no right to accumulated assets.

The differences between the two are these:

1) Yugoslavia is a socialist country and social ownership is a part of the constitution, whereas the kibbutz movement is only a small sector in a capitalist economy although it is also part of the larger sector of the labor economy.

2) In Yugoslavia, membership is in a work organization; in the kibbutz, it is in a comprehensive community.

3) The bearer of the formal ownership is in Yugoslavia an abstract entity - the society; whereas in the kibbutz, it is for all practical purposes the kibbutz federation, which plays an active role in the life of the kibbutz community.

4) The kibbutz is a communal society, and the kibbutz member has no individual household and no private monetary income; in Yugoslavia, both factors are present. The motivations in Yugoslavia are therefore more economically oriented and utilitarian than in the kibbutz.

5) Inside a kibbutz, there are no differences in consumption or in standard of living related to the members’ roles in work or in public activity; in the Yugoslav economic units, there is inequality of income, based theoretically on the principle of to each according to his work.

6) Rather strong economic inequalities exist between economic units in Yugoslavia, especially between enterprises located in different regions and republics. In spite of differences in income and assets between kibbutz communities, differences in standard of living and especially in current consumption are limited.
Social structure, ownership and self-management

A good starting point a the theoretical analysis of these differences between the kibbutz and Yugoslavia is the “iron law of correspondence between social structure and regulative models,” which is at the center of V. Rus’ (1984) evaluation of 30 years of Yugoslav self-management.

Rus developed this law after citing studies both on Yugoslav self-management (especially those by Horvat, (1982); Golubovic, (1982); and Zupanov, (1981) and on kibbutz social structure and direct democracy (Cohen, 1975; Rosner & Cohen, 1980). His central argument concerning Yugoslavia is that the critique of the actual situation of Yugoslav self-management by Yugoslav social scientists, like Horat and Golubovic, is based on “a non realistic assumption about the social structure of Yugoslav society and that of the self managed organizations”. Horvat and Golubovic understand self management to mean “a non-utilitarian community with high ideological commitment, a high level of solidarity and a highly developed system of self regulation” (Rus, 1984 p. 378). Rus considered these assumptions “premature,” since they presuppose abolishment of the market as a social regulator and of the division of labor as a model of work organization (ibid, p. 384). In Rus’ opinion, the prevalent Yugoslav social structure is not of a non-utilitarian community, but of many segmented, unifunctional associations. Following Cohen’s and Rosner & Cohen’s analyses of the kibbutz, Rus assumed that a correspondence existed between community and direct democracy and between segmented associations and representative democracy. In his opinion, the “existing system of income distribution is based on...a utilitarian principle according to which work legitimates ownership.” (ibid., p. 381). This aspect and the persistence of a hierarchichal division of labor created the internalization of a contradiction between labor and capital. “Too much energy was being spent to overcome and to abolish existing contradictions in Yugoslavia self-management, instead of trying to develop more sophisticated instruments for their regulation” (pp. 382-382). The concrete proposals for such regulations “are not focused on creating a democratic distribution of power” (p.
It was expected that the changes would lead to a more polyarchic distribution of power (p. 386).

Rus' important article was cited extensively both because we agree assumption about a law of correspondence and because his assessment of the Yugoslav social structure contrasts sharply with this author's understanding kibbutz social structure. Considered from a comparative point of view, the kibbutz social structure is still very close to the normative ideal of a non-utilitarian community or the "total association" that was the point of departure in Rus' analysis.

In spite of the structural transformations analyzed by Cohen (1976), the kibbutz communities maintain all the features that define, according to Rus, (following Zupanov), a total association or community: the kibbutz is multi-functional; it is based on the almost total inclusion of its members; it tries to satisfy all the needs of its members; and the roles in the kibbutz are only partly specified. The kibbutz is not a traditional community, its purpose to form a new community, in Buber's terms, one that is close to the Marxist vision of an "unalienated transparent community" (Rosner). It has no formal judiciary system, and most issues are decided on a person oriented, particularistic basis although trends toward more formal rules are developing. The formal by laws are almost irrelevant to the internal life of the kibbutz (Saltman, 1983; Shapira, 1976).

As economic units in a capitalist economy and market, the kibbutzim had to introduce a certain division of labor and a functional differentiation that lead, together with other changes - especially the growing importance of the family, and generational differences - to transformations of the social structure. Being aware of these trends, the kibbutz federations initiated a series of countervailing measures.

Non-utilitarian community structure, ideological commitment and social cohesion constitute the basis for the communal social ownership form of the kibbutz. On the
other hand, the communal household and social ownership instead of group ownership help to maintain its non-utilitarian internal orientation. The kibbutz communities have up to now generally succeeded in segregating their a utilitarian orientation, as economic units on the market, from the non-utilitarian and non-alienated relationships inside the community. These internal community relationships, not the ownership form per se provide the basis of the particular type of participatory political and organizational democracy in the kibbutz.

**Self-management and hierarchy**

From a normative point of view, “democracy in the kibbutz community and in the kibbutz industrial plant is close to the ideal-type of participatory democracy” (Rosner, 1983, p. 458). Kibbutz democracy is perceived as an end in itself, promoting equality in every member's influence and strengthening their commitment to the combined good of the community. It is a basic principle in all areas of kibbutz life and in everyday life. Democratic decision-making is perceived mainly as a process of problem solving and only occasionally as a mechanism for the distribution of scarce goods among competing interest groups.

These features of kibbutz democracy correspond very closely to the common denominator of many theories of participatory democracy (Bachrach, 1967; Pateman, 1970, 1983; McPherson, 1977; and B. Barber, 1984). A series of empirical studies offers an opportunity to evaluate the implementation of the normative model in one of the more problematic areas of kibbutz self-management - industrial plants. A comparison of 10 kibbutz factories with 13 Yugoslav self-managed plants, on the one hand, and 10 conventionally managed factories in one each of three other countries (U.S.A., Italy, Austria) on the other hand, shows both the similarities between the two self-management systems and their differences (Tannenbaum, et al., 1977).
Both self-managed systems show a high degree of worker participation in decision-making on the plant level and a much more egalitarian distribution of control than in conventionally managed plants in the other countries. In both systems, though, there is also a hierarchical distribution of authority; furthermore, those in higher positions have more psychological rewards, such as intrinsic job satisfaction. In spite of this, workers both in Yugoslavia and in the kibbutz have low aspirations to advancement to managerial positions. In Yugoslavia, this can be explained by the data that show limited opportunities for advancement. In the kibbutz, however, high opportunities for advancement are perceived by workers. The reason for their relative reluctance to use them is assumed to be that "for many members the benefits of advancement do not justify the costs" (Tannenbaum, et al., 1974, p. 83). Although kibbutz managers do not receive greater material advantages than do workers, they face unique difficulties. The managers cannot use formal sanctions and so may "suffer tensions associated with the need to exercise authority over others, while adhering to egalitarian values" (p. 85). This situation also explains why informal participation and a participatory leadership style are much more frequent in the kibbutz than in any of the other countries. On the other hand, the control function of hierarchical superiors is limited, and co-workers bear the main role in the social control of the behavior of members at work.

Other special features of kibbutz hierarchy were illustrated in a comparative study between kibbutz plants and West German plants functioning in the framework of a co-determination system (Bertolke, et al., 198). The study shows that in the kibbutz plants, hierarchy was reduced to a functional aspect of coordination, whereas in F.R.G., hierarchical control was based mainly on ownership rights. The distribution of control, measured by the control graph instrument, was almost the same in all the areas in F.R.G. plants, with plant management at the top and management personnel in the middle. In the kibbutz-plant management has the highest degree of control only in the area of budgets; while in other areas, supervisors and middle management have the most influence. One of the conclusions emanating from this study was that "private
ownership makes a difference for the distribution of control and that by neutralizing the capital necessary for industrial production it is possible to diminish inequality in control of strata of organization members" (p. 156). The authors stressed, also, that differences between the two types of organizations were not limited to ownership. Plant participation in the kibbutz "is part of an overall system designed for direct and indirect democracy and a minimization of inequalities within a communal structure" (p. 164).

Self-management in industrial plants as was mentioned previously, is one of the more problematic areas of kibbutz democracy. This state of affairs was shown also in a comparison between political democracy in kibbutz communities and organizational democracy in industrial plants (Rosner, 1983). The assumption made by many proponents of participatory democracy (e.g. Pateman, 1970), that factories are the most appropriate place to implement participatory democracy, was not corroborated. In that study, which reached this conclusion: "The opportunities for a kibbutz member's direct participation in decision making - as part of everyday life and not as a special role - are larger in the political framework of the community general assembly and committees than in the organizational structure of the kibbutz factory... Functional division of labor, unchallenging work and a hierarchical distribution of authority persist, despite efforts to improve the quality of working life through job enrichment and enlargement, rotation mechanisms, election of managerial personnel, etc." (Rosner, 1983, p. 179). The role of the kibbutz member in the plant is more ambiguous than in the community. In the community, the main basis for social relations is interpersonal, and specific roles in different formal areas are of secondary importance. In the plant, role specific relationships, based on a functional division of labor and a hierarchical distribution of authority, are more important.

The differences between plant and community in the implementation of self management also point to the limited function of ownership. The industrial plant belongs to the kibbutz community, and the central decisions concerning investments in
it and its development are taken by the kibbutz general assembly. The differences, therefore, cannot be explained by ownership.

The reason for the more limited implementation of self management lies in the tension between the egalitarian communal structure and values of the kibbutz and the functional division of labor and hierarchical structure of the plant. The kibbutz communities have generally succeeded in avoiding processes of oligarchization and monopolization of power positions that are quite frequent even in cooperatives and other types of voluntary organizations.

The rotation system for central managerial roles, both in the kibbutz community and in kibbutz factories, continues to function in spite of the growing complexity of both entities. The main structural factor explaining this rather exceptional organizational feature seems to be the egalitarian reward-structure, based on the dissociation between contribution and need satisfaction.

Recent findings about "horizontal rotation" for economic managers (Helman, 1980) do not contradict this basic structural fact. Helman found that among a sample of economic office holders - kibbutz economic coordinators, kibbutz treasurers and industrial plant managers - there is a trend not to go back to their previous jobs after the end of their term, but to move to other managerial roles inside, as well as outside, the kibbutz community. There seem to be two reasons for this trend:

1) A higher degree of professionalization. After receiving a period of training before office holding and after obtaining experience during the term of office, some kibbutz managers perceive economic management as a profession and not only as an elected public office.

2) The demand for experienced economic managers in the expanding enterprise of kibbutz regional and nation-wide organizations. Although horizontal rotation might create certain inequalities in the kibbutz, it does not create a monopolization of power positions inside the kibbutz plants, or in other organizational frameworks.
A more serious problem inside the kibbutz system is the development of a gap between the very demanding participatory structure of the kibbutz and the low propensity of at least a part of the membership to participate.

Kibbutz members and office holders alike complain about the low level of participation at the weekly assembly and consider this a sign of apathy. (The percentage of members participating in an average assembly is around 30%, around 50% participate in at least half of the assemblies, but 20% show almost no participation at all.) In most of the kibbutz communities, a general assembly is held almost every week. In kibbutz plants, there is a workers' assembly almost every week. Many kibbutz members are elected to committees, in the kibbutz, in the plant and in other organizational frameworks, which generally convene after work hours. By way of comparison, in the American plywood cooperatives, the whole membership meets only twice a year. In the Mondragon cooperative, a general assembly is conducted only once a year (Greenberg, 1986). This annual frequency is also the case for the traditional township meetings in New England.

Members differ in their readiness to use the opportunities for participation in decision-making that are available in all the areas of kibbutz life and on different levels of responsibility. These differences cannot be explained by differences in class background, education or participation in the past. The propensity to participate seems related more to the importance attributed to competing commitments, such as family, artistic inclinations or hobbies. The degree of identification and commitment to the community, and the self-image about the ability to exercise personal influence are among the main predictors of participation (Rosner, 1983).

Members perceive more opportunities to exercise influence in smaller groups (e.g. work groups, committees) than in the large assemblies. On the other hand, they are not ready to give up the decision-making authority of the general assembly, where they can participate whenever they are interested. Attempts to replace the assembly by an elected
representative council have always failed. The only kibbutz that took such a decision reinstalled the assembly system after a year and a half.

To sum up, even in the overall participatory system of the kibbutz, there is a need to revitalize democracy, which cannot be assured by institutions and formal regulations. The degree of implementation seems to depend mainly on the social cohesion of the community and on members' commitment to its common good. From a comparative point of view, the kibbutz seems to be close to the type of grass-roots coops and collectives found in J. Rothschild-Whitt's (1983) typology. She mainly compared two of the four types in her typology, which combines the degree of worker ownership with the degree of worker control (p. 370). These two types - worker-ownership options that exist in the U.S., are (1) employee owned firms, which are generally high on the ownership dimensions and low on control; and (2) grass-root co-ops and collective, which are generally high on both dimensions. The author noted that "the organizational structure of the kibbutz and of the grassroots coops have been both presented previously as alternatives to Weber's ideal type of bureaucracy" (in Rosner, 1973; and Rothschild-Whitt, 1979).

This similarity in organizational structure seems to be an outcome of a more basic similarity between the kibbutz and American alternative institutions. "The development of cooperatives in the 1970s was the natural outgrowth of counter-cultural values and sentiments developed and expressed in the social movements of the 1960s" (Rotiaschild-Whitt, 1983, p. 399). Both in the kibbutz and in the grass-roots cooperatives, the basic motivation for the creation of alternative institutions was not economic, but part of a broader ideology.

As discussed in an earlier analysis (Rosner, 1983), it is possible to distinguish not only between different types of motivation to create or to join organizations, but also between different types of motivation for performance and contribution to the goals of the organization. In both the kibbutz and American alternative organizations,
identification with the overall goals of the organization, the community or the movement is central, and economic remunerations are relatively less important. By contrast, studies show that in Yugoslavia, the motivation to participate is related to the expectation of influencing the decision of the self-managing body in order to derive more personal economic benefits (Supek, 1973, Rus, 1984). Economic motivation - at least in joining the organization - is also central in the American plywood cooperatives (Greenberg, 1986) and in the Mondragon cooperatives (Bradley, and Gelb, 1985).

"In the kibbutz we can assume collective, though not individual economic motivation.... The goal of creating viable economic organizations both in agriculture and in industry was an important aspect of the original ideology" (Rosner, 1983, p. 472). The degree of economic efficiency is one of the bases of the living standard in the kibbutz community in the framework of the normative consumption budget suggested by the kibbutz movement. Because, however, of the dissociation between an individual’s contribution at work and that individual’s standard of living, the collective economic motivation will be effective only when there is a rather high level of identification within the community by the member.

The centrality of economic motivations in work is replaced in the kibbutz largely by the motivations for self-realization and self-actualization. These motivations explain also the central role of the nature of work in the kibbutz.

**Nature of work and new technologies in the kibbutz**

Russel (1985) remarked on the difficulties in combining shared ownership with "a more meaningful and effective relationship between work and ownership." The question is, whether shared ownership "motivates and rewards the worker’s use of the property" and whether work both reflects and enhances that ownership. Russel cited at length different theoretical approaches - from Aristotle to G. Simmel - that gave a negative answer to this question. In many cases, he found, worker-ownership did not result in a meaningful change in the nature of work. On the other hand, attempts to improve
the quality of working life by introducing socio-technical change often occurred on the basis of private, capitalist ownership - on a larger basis in Scandinavia than in other western countries.

Russel also noted that while Marx had an optimistic view of shared ownership, he had in mind the transcendence and abolition not only of private property but of property itself. He cites Marx's vision that: "Work no longer serves as a means to life, but has emerged as life prime want" (p. 20). Work would be intrinsically motivated as a way of self-expression and self realization, while the extrinsic monetary rewards could then be supplied by shared ownership and so lose its importance. It was de-alienation, not shared ownership for economic purposes that Marx had in mind. The distribution of the means of consumption according to needs would create the possibility of choosing work according to one's aspirations and abilities, without subjugation to economic, class-determined constraints. This relationship between the liberation from economic constraints and the rise in aspirations for self-realization was also a key element in other theories, from the utopian writings of Fourier to contemporary proponents of a universal guaranteed income (Van der Veen, and Van Parijs, 1987, Gorz, 1983).

The kibbutz approach to the nature of work is much closer to this tradition of thought than to the assumption about the motivating outcomes of shared ownership.

Traditionally work was perceived in the kibbutz not only as an instrument to achieve economic goals, but as a moral obligation, part of the pioneer ethos, which can be compared in its motivating function with the Protestant ethos. A major element in the pioneer ethos was agricultural work as a way to overcome the alienating split between man and nature. In spite of the many changes introduced into the kibbutz and inter-generational differences, work continues to occupy a central place in the life space of members. In the younger generations, aspirations to self-realization in work through professionalization now receive a higher priority than formerly. The importance of the
specific kibbutz context in the development of these aspirations has been shown in a series of comparative studies. (Ronen, 1978, compared workers in kibbutz plants with non-kibbutz industrial workers in Israel. Rabin and Beit-Hallahmi, 1982 compared kibbutz born young adults with those born in moshav cooperative settlements. Rosner (1980) compared kibbutz born who were living in kibbutzim with those staying in a city after leaving the kibbutz).

Empirical studies have shown that better opportunities for self-realization in work in industrial plants lead to a higher commitment to the plant, while average commitment of plant workers is positively correlated with indicators of economic efficiency (Leviatan, 1980). Opportunities for intrinsic work satisfaction also constitute an important factor in attracting members to specific types of work. Another factor that contributes to the demand for non-alienating, intrinsically satisfying work in the kibbutz is the relatively high level of education of kibbutz members: almost 45% of the members received at least some academic or professional higher education, whereas there are only few that have less than high school education,

Similarities can be shown between the kibbutz and Scandinavia - especially Norway and Sweden - in the factors behind the demand and supply for non-alienating work, in spite of the basic differences in ownership. In Scandinavia rising education and income levels, the existence of a comprehensive social welfare system and a policy of full employment have raised the demand for non-alienating work. In the kibbutz, full employment is a given, and communal responsibility for individual need-satisfaction is the functional equivalent of the welfare state and the income effect in Scandinavia.

There are also similarities in supply factors - both systems have a relatively closed and homogeneous labor market, in contradistinction to the high percentage of foreign or immigrant workers and the segregated labor market in many other Western countries. Employers and managers in Scandinavia are therefore more dependent on workers' readiness to accept certain types of jobs and are prepared to pay a higher price for
workers' readiness to work in industry. The price paid by a relatively large number of Scandinavian employers includes changes in the socio-technical organization of work, through job enlargement and enrichment, and the creation of autonomous and semi-autonomous work groups. According to certain estimates, 20% of the workers in Sweden and Norway are employed in enterprises using the socio-technical approach to work organization, this figure compares with the less than 5% in other advanced industrial countries. Nevertheless, the introduction of the socio-technical approach has not always been successful, and in many cases the initial attempts have had to be discontinued. Only in few cases has a multi-level approach, combining autonomous groups at the shop floor with trade union co-determination in strategic decision making, been implemented (Gardell, 1983). Even the limited attempts at changing ownership patterns in Sweden through wage-owner funds have encountered very strong opposition by employers, who were otherwise ready to cooperate in changing the nature of industrial work.

Strong similarities can be found between the traditional organization of work in kibbutz agricultural branches and the socio-technical approach, such as small autonomous work groups, job rotation and efforts at the widespread large diffusion of professional knowledge. With the introduction of industry, conventional industrial technology and some elements of the hierarchical organization were adopted. Comparative studies have shown a higher degree of alienative aspects in kibbutz industry than in agriculture (Eden and Leviatan, 1980) although in comparison with industrial workers from other countries kibbutz workers had significant lower score on alienation scales (Tannenbaum et al., 1974). The main alarming signal was the reluctance of many kibbutz members, especially the younger members, to work in industrial production. Several steps have been taken by kibbutz communities and movements to counter this situation:

a. The creation of a special socio-technical department, to advise kibbutz plants when introducing organizational and technological changes in existing factories in order to
improve the quality of working life. Although this activity is not always successful or lasting; nevertheless, its effects are felt in a large number of plants.

b. Introduction of new technologies. The first stage of this strategy occurred in 1960 and was related more to the ideological issue of the non-employment of hired labor than to the improvement of work conditions. When industrialization first came to the kibbutz, in the 1940s and 1950s, it was mostly labor-intensive factories that were started; in some the outcome was the employment of a high percentage of non-kibbutz members as hired workers. Other kibbutz communities, mainly affiliated with more left-wing federations did not agree with this policy. After searching for another type of industry, many of these kibbutzim started small and medium-sized capital-intensive factories with more advanced technologies. Other kibbutzim followed in this direction, and today many kibbutz factories are concentrated in the plastics branch, typical of the new trend. (Kibbutz factories produce 40% of the overall Israeli output of this branch, but only 6.8% of the total Israeli industrial production.) On the other hand, most kibbutz plants decided to avoid employing of hired labor in their further development.

One consequence decision was the relatively fast introduction of new, computerized technologies in the 1970s and 1980s. While the 300 kibbutz plants employ only 6% of the total industrial workforce in Israel, they use 60% of the industrial robots. The spread of computerized numerical control (CNC) has also been much faster than in the general industry. The introduction of these technologies made it possible to expand industrial output by 75% from 1975-1986, while at the same time decreasing the number of hired workers. Survey data show that the readiness of kibbutz members, particularly the younger members, to work in industry has increased (Weiss, 1987). The change in attitude seems to be related to the improvement in working conditions and a change in the composition of the industrial work force. Previously a high percentage was employed in relatively non-skilled production jobs, today, only a minority is employed in direct production, while more people are needed in maintenance, quality control, research and development, marketing, etc., areas in which more professional knowledge is needed. In a typical kibbutz factory using computerized technologies, no more than
40-50% of the work-force is employed in production. Moreover, even in direct production, an increase in the professional level has occurred, with a growing demand for technicians and engineers.

Both the decision patterns concerning the introduction of new technologies and their impact on the division of labor are relevant to the ongoing discussion on the social implications of these technologies.

A series of research studies have pointed to the de-skilling implications of the new technologies. Following Braverman (1974) their authors believe that management will use technology to further its control over production at the expense of workers’ skill and autonomy (Shaiken, 1984; Noble 1984). The efficient use of these technologies it has also been pointed out, requires overcoming the conventional scientific-management and tailoristic approach to the division of labor and authority. Kern & Schuman (1986) suggest new integrative concepts of production, based on skill enlargement and cooperative work groups. Walton and Sussman (1985) noted the inefficiency of hierarchical control in the new conditions and the need to enhance worker commitment. Zuboff (1988) opposed the assumptions of technological determinism and demonstrated in her analysis that the new technologies demand - but do not guarantee - a more flexible, democratic work environment.

In a cross national comparative study on the impact of programmable automation, Kelley (1986) found no conclusive evidence to support either the de-skilling or the skill upgrading theories. In addition to country and plant specific factors, managerial strategies in influencing the use of new technologies were of crucial importance. From the empirical data, Kelley found that the impact of the scientific management approach lead to de-skilling while a techno-centered participative approach lead to skill-upgrading. She also specified a theoretical “worker centered participative approach”. This third approach “implied “a radical decentralization of control and responsibilities in production, providing for an unambiguous skill upgrading effect on production roles
and allowing for the greatest flexibility in adapting the technology to new uses and in speedily solving implementation problems" (p. 240). In theory, the kibbutz strategy should be close to this “missing” type in Kelley’s empirical data.

First reports of ongoing research on new technologies in kibbutz industry show that the kibbutzim exhibit a rather high degree of flexibility in adapting the technology to plant specific uses (Bartolke, 1986). Plant workers were found to participate in almost all the decision-making stages on the introduction of new technologies (Rosner, 1986). A trend can be observed to the growing autonomy of the sub-units using new technology; and a non-tailoristic division of labor, which also prevailed in previous stages, seems to be prevalent. Overall conclusive evidence on this point is still missing, but the kibbutz experience illustrates that contrary to the assumptions of technological determinism, the new technologies do create an option for organizational choice.

Although the overall effect of the new technologies seems to be an improvement in the quality of working life, they also created a series of new problems. One problem is the possibility of over investment in new technologies. Arguments have been advanced that over-investment in industry in general and in new technology in particular might be one of the causes of the current economic crisis in many kibbutz communities. Many Israeli non-kibbutz industries also find themselves in a crisis situation; it is possible though that non-economic considerations led kibbutz factories in some cases to investment decisions that were not economically justified. Another new problem concerns higher dependence on professional knowledge, especially in the area of research and development, that is needed but not always available in a single kibbutz community. A temporary solution is the hiring of professionals from outside the kibbutz. In the long range, the trend is to stronger cooperation between different kibbutz factories.

In spite of such problems, it is possible to conclude that there is a basic compatibility between, on the one hand, the values and social and organizational structure of the kibbutz and, on the other, the conditions needed for the diffusion of computerized
industrial technologies and their efficient use. The use of these technologies fits the basic kibbutz approach of de-alienation in work, and this explains why there is almost no evidence of conflicts related to their introduction.

It seems that the kibbutz experience corroborates Russel's (1985) conclusion that employee participation in decision making is more meaningful and effective in workplaces in which skills are widely shared (p. 58). The kibbutz agriculture branch, which functions as an autonomous work group informed by a large diffusion of knowledge, illustrates this connection. It seems too that the re-skilling effect of new technologies in the kibbutz plant might have led to their having a greater similarity in structure to the agriculture branches in contradistinction to the usual plant hierarchical structure, which is based on gaps in knowledge and skills. Russel concluded that the sharing of professional skills facilitates the introduction of worker ownership. In the kibbutz case, communal ownership and the communal household create the conditions for a restructuring of the conventional division of labor in the direction of sharing of skills.

A Comprehensive Typology

The theme of this article has been the particular relationship between ownership participation in decision making and the nature of work in the Israeli kibbutz. Attention was focused on the special features characterizing the kibbutz approach in each of these areas.

The important social innovations of the kibbutz were implemented not only in each of these three areas, but especially in their interrelationship. A widespread assumption, originating in the nineteenth century was that worker ownership was a necessary condition for democracy in work organization. Ownership rights would form the basis for the workers' control. It was assumed, too, that worker ownership would lead to de-alienation in work. In many cases these assumptions have not been realized.
United States provides the most recent example of workers' ownership rights that have generally not resulted in effective worker participation in decision-making (Russel, 1985; Blasi, 1988). Many cooperatives and even the Yugoslav self management system have shown little interest in a de-alienating change in the nature of work.

In these assumptions the change in ownership was considered the major causal variable; in the kibbutz case, the communal ideology and the communal social structure formed the starting point. Following Russ (1984), therefore all three above-mentioned areas - ownership, participation and nature of work may be considered different forms of regulations or social institutions that have to correspond to the prevailing social structure. On the basis of our comparative analysis a continuum can be established at least of the different forms of social structure in worker-owned organizations. Of the two opposite poles of this continuum, one would be the kibbutz which from a normative point of view can be conceptualized in Rus' terms as a non-utilitarian community with high ideological commitment, a high level of solidarity and a highly developed system of self regulation. At the other pole would be unifunctional segmented associations, based mainly on utilitarian economic motivations and goals, with mainly formal, role specific social relations. Organizations with this latter type of structure are surely the new Esop worker ownership firms, but also quite a number of traditional cooperatives that were initially closer to the other pole of the continuum. Meister (1973) documented the transition from the community pole to the segmented association pole for a large number of cooperatives and also other types of voluntary associations.

Rus who assumed that the Yugoslav self-managed enterprises are closer to the segmented-association type, argued against "idealized misconceptions" in considering them closer to the community type. The grass-roots cooperatives in Rothschild-Whitt's (1984) typology might be closer to the community type, while the American plywood cooperatives (Greenberg, 1986) are today closer to the segmented association type. On
the basis of this conceptualization, it is not difficult to define the types of ownership, participation and approaches to the nature of work.

In the segmented association type, at least in capitalist countries, a shareholder or an Esop-type ownership pattern will be prevalent. Management will be hierarchical; in many cooperatives, managers are hired from the outside. Participation in decision-making will be mostly indirect through representatives, with the possibility of power-monopolization. The division of labor will be conventional, and there will be no special interest in work restructuring. The introduction of new technologies will be motivated mainly by economic considerations.

The forms of regulation corresponding to the community type structure have been presented in detail in our analysis of the kibbutz case.

It is now possible to present a comparative table of these two opposite types. On the basis of the typology presented in Table I, it is perhaps also possible to answer the general questions that were asked in the introduction: Are worker ownership and work-place democracy complementary reforms? Do they lead to changes in the nature of work or do they tend to preserve a conventional work organization? It is our conclusion there is no general no or yes answer to these questions. The answer depends on the position of the organization on the continuum of social structure types. When a more utilitarian economic approach is dominant, there exist more possibilities for power monopolization and membership apathy, as well as for an adversary relationship between rank and file and management. In the case of economic success the distribution of economic rewards might mitigate the adversary relationship; on the other hand, crisis situations might aggravate it and eventually lead to the collapse of the cooperative.
Table 1
Two Types of Social and Institutional Structure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Social Structure</th>
<th>Organizational Structure</th>
<th>Dominant Motivation</th>
<th>Degree of Member's Inclusion</th>
<th>Ownership</th>
<th>Basic Organizational Relationship</th>
<th>Distribution of Material Rewards</th>
<th>Participation in Decision Making</th>
<th>Managerial Hierarchy</th>
<th>Nature of Work</th>
<th>Introduction of New Technologies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Comprehensive community</td>
<td>Multi-functional</td>
<td>Ideological and social</td>
<td>Total inclusion</td>
<td>Communal-social</td>
<td>Mutual trust</td>
<td>Egalitarian, partly according to needs</td>
<td>Direct, non-restricted participation</td>
<td>Limited, functional</td>
<td>De-alienating</td>
<td>Salience of Social Considerations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Segmented association</td>
<td>Unifunctional, economic</td>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Partial inclusion - professional role</td>
<td>Cooperative shareholders</td>
<td>Contractual legal</td>
<td>Mostly based on work role and contribution; sometimes egalitarian</td>
<td>Indirect, restricted participation</td>
<td>Conventional</td>
<td>Mainly Economic Considerations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The internal logic of the community approach is the opposite. Economic success depends largely on members' non-economic motivations, and their commitment to the community and the specific branch. Participation in decision-making and the intrinsic satisfaction of workers are major predictors of these commitments. Even from a limited
economic perspective, therefore, it is both functional and rational to create the conditions for more participation and more opportunities for self-realization.

To the presentation of this typology some words of caution should be added. First, ideal types, which are theoretical constructs were dealt with here, not concrete situations. The ideal type is static; reality in contrast, is dynamic and there are movements from one point on the continuum to another. For example, as an outcome of the recent economic crisis in kibbutz communities, discussions were started about the need for structural changes in the kibbutz system that would lead to a New Kibbutz. For the moment, different specific suggestions have been made and no overall concept has been presented; however the overall direction of these proposals seems to be toward a weakening of the communal elements and more segmentation. Some arguments even use the law of correspondence logic; the contention is that in the changed social structure of the heterogeneous, multi-generational, large kibbutz, with its weaker ideological commitment, it is not possible to maintain the traditional institutional forms.

Among the suggestions offered are the following: more representative forms of democracy, limitations on rotation in managerial positions and even some material rewards for office holding, such as more vacations as compensation for over investment of time. Other suggestions include material rewards for overtime work in industry, encouragement of employment outside the kibbutz, separation between work-place and community by creating joint factories worked by several kibbutzim. Although there exist many differences in social and institutional structure among kibbutzim, almost none of these suggestions has been implemented up to now. As mentioned, their proponents see in these suggestions only adaptations of the kibbutz, not a transition to another, non-communal social structure. The main counter-argument speaks against the law of correspondence logic, stressing the need for the internal consistency of the kibbutz system. Its assumption is that the implementation of these suggestions will lead to a weakening of the kibbutz system and, therefore, to less commitment, even to lower economic efficiency. What is needed, according to this position, is to strengthen social
cohesion in the kibbutz, and ideological commitment on the one hand, and to revitalize the self management system by enlarging members' participation and their opportunities for self realization, on the other hand.

This discussion well illustrates that the position of the kibbutz at one pole of the continuum is not a stable one and that both internal and external forces exist that might lead to changes. At the other pole, there are also different forces acting in different directions.

In a recent analysis of the most extreme segmentary-association type - the U.S. Esops -- Blasi (1988) presented the kibbutz and the Mondragon cooperative "as a base line for our expectations" (p. 200). The kibbutz is viewed as the purest example of labor capital identification in any democratic country; and although the kibbutz example is too extreme for the U.S. could teach some lessons. The main lesson is that the kibbutz, and Mondragon, avoid "the radical worker control model and the extreme management-domination model. They prove that management's fear of business disintegration or management mauling is unfounded. Once that fear is debunked, the justification for the management domination model disappears" (pp. 200-201). Blasi defined the important role of the kibbutz social structure in these terms: the community character of the kibbutz leads to powerful mutual identification among members and with the economic social community as a whole, rather than with individual roles. The author, however, did not mention the dissociation between work role and material rewards, which has a crucial role in the management worker relationship. In any event, Blasi pointed to the need for the Esops to move away from the extreme pole of the continuum, where they are now located according to our conceptualization.

Limitations are, of course, created by social structure, but there is no place for social structure determinism. The role of social structure and of values should be stressed against legalistic and narrow economic approaches to worker ownership. Social structure, though, is not only a given, it is an outcome of human action and of human
values. One of the shortcomings of the Yugoslavian approach to self-management seems to be the uniform, legalistic attempt to create the same institutional framework for very diverse social structures and cultural backgrounds. On the other hand, an experimental and pluralistic approach was the background for the development of the Israeli kibbutz. Value orientations and social relations, as well as cultural and national contexts might lead in the future to social structures that are closer to one or the other pole of the continuum. Similarly ideological considerations might lead to the encouragement of one or the other type.

The members of the various types of organizations will, in the end, shape their social structure and their institutions. The role of social science is to help make choices and actions more rational by analyzing the internal logic of different systems and showing the degree of compatibility between different social structures and institutions.
Notes

1. The term "communal society" is used here rather than "commune", which has been used widely in the U.S. when dealing with the collective communities of the 1960s and 1970s. The reason is that the term "commune" refers usually to one group or one community whereas "communal society" seems more appropriate for dealing with larger communal movements, such as the kibbutz, the Hutterian communities, etc. Because of the diversity of historical and contemporary communal societies and communes, there is no generally agreed scientific definition. One of the few formal definitions in the literature is Zablocki's (1980, p.7), which is an inductive definition, based on the U.S. contemporary communes, although it can fit, with some changes, other communal societies including the kibbutz. Following this definition, a communal society may be defined as any group of adult individuals who have decided to live together, without compulsion, for an indefinite period of time primarily for the sake of an ideological goal focused on the achievement of community, for which a collective household is deemed essential. Additional elements included here but not in Zablocki's definition are community of property, egalitarianism and communal child rearing. On the other hand, one component of Zablocki's definition, dealing with the anti-familistic aspect of U.S. communes is not accepted here.

2. After the decision to establish Nir, there were also strong controversies as to its authority. The leadership of the Histadrut initially wanted Nir to be involved in the internal management of the moshav and kibbutz communities. The leadership of the moshav communities was opposed at first to the establishment of Nir. Eventually a compromise was worked out on limiting the authority of Nir to formal ownership and to the relationship between the communities and the Zionist Organization, which allocated the land and long-term loans for basic investments.
3. In the more than 80 years history of the kibbutz movement, there have been only a few cases of the liquidation of kibbutz communities. Usually the kibbutz movements sent reinforcements to communities in crises to prevent this step. In most of the few cases where this was not possible, new groups were started with the help of the movement - a new community to replace the previous one. The reasons for liquidation were mostly social and political crises, not economic. Of 13 cases of liquidation analyzed by Ben Chorin (1983), only three involved dominant economic reasons for the liquidation.

4. In recent discussions following the current economic crisis, there have been demands to expand the economic autonomy of kibbutzim and to limit the economic role of the movements. Up to now, these opinions seem to be in the minority; in fact, the economic involvement of the movements in the kibbutz communities is stronger than before, both through financial aid and stronger guidance and control concerning investments.

5. An empirical study, 800 respondents from 20 kibbutz communities were asked how important it was for them to achieve different personal goals. The percentage of respondents answering “Very important” in various categories was as follows: to have a strong feeling of belonging to the kibbutz - 70.4%; to have opportunities for personal development and self-realization - 30%; to have influence on what happens in the kibbutz - 28.7%; to have a high standard of living - 7.9%. (unpublished data taken from research on consumption in the kibbutz conducted in 1987 by the Institute for Research on the Kibbutz and the Cooperative Idea, University of Haifa.

6. In the contemporary kibbutz, the decision of where to work permanently is largely a personal one. There are limits, however, to this personal choice - the occupations available at a given moment in the kibbutz and in outside workplaces that are part of the kibbutz system, (e.g. regional enterprises, kibbutz movement institutions).
The work committee may suggest to members choosing a certain branch according to its priorities, but the final decision is by the member himself. Recent survey data show the following distribution of answers to the question: How did you reach your present permanent work branch?

1) On the initiative of the kibbutz institution and in spite of my resistance: 5.3%
2) On the initiative of the kibbutz institutions, with my agreement: 43.4%
3) I came by chance and decided to stay: 9.1%
4) I wanted to work there and it was agreed: 42.2%

(Sample consisted of 700 respondents from two old, large kibbutz communities participating in the research on the social structure of the kibbutz. Non-published data collected in 1987 by the Institute for Research on the Kibbutz and the Cooperative Idea, University of Haifa.

7. There is no labor market in the conventional sense in the kibbutz, since workers cannot be attracted by changing monetary rewards. Although there are changes in demand for the number of workers, the supply, at least for kibbutz members, is constant in the short run. Only the number of hired workers or other temporary workers from the outside is variable, but they constitute only a small percentage of the overall kibbutz work force.)


Ronen, S. (1978) Personal values - a basis for work motivational set and work attitudes. In:


